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Introduction
The development of cooperative security in Southeast Asia has been noteworthy.
The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been
pursuing new cooperative security agendas – namely, confidence-building measures
(CBMs), preventive diplomacy (PD), conflict resolution and a set of agendas
associated with security communities. In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),1 an
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the British International Studies Association (BISA)
conference at the University of St. Andrews on 21 December 2005 and the International Studies
Association (ISA) Annual Convention in Chicago on 2 March 2007. I thank the participants in these
meetings and anonymous reviews for their useful comments.
1 The ARF is an Asia-Pacific region-wide framework, involving almost all the countries in the region.
ASEAN established this forum in July 1993, holding the first ARF meeting in July 1994. The ARF
participants today are the ten ASEAN members – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the
Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar – together with China, Russia, Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Papua New Guinea, the EU, the US, India,
Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Timor Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
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Asia-Pacific region-wide security forum, they have identified three stages of the
ARF process: the developments of CBMs, PD and conflict-resolution mechanisms
– or measures used in approaching conflicts. Following the first ARF meeting in
July 1994, they announced these three stages in March 1995 by drawing up the
ARF Concept Paper.2 In 1997, they started exploring the possibilities of PD.3
Furthermore, within the framework of ASEAN, they have set out a plan to
establish an ‘ASEAN security community’ in which conflicts are managed
collectively. In their summit meeting in October 2003, in Bali, Indonesia, they
adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, replacing the Declaration of
ASEAN Concord I, issued in 1976. In the ASEAN Concord II, they set out a plan
to promote community building in three areas, namely, security, economy and
society. Elements of a security community include ‘conflict prevention’, ‘conflict
resolution’ and ‘post-conflict peace building’.4
How can we capture these developments? In what terms can the ASEAN
members’ pursuit of new cooperative security be explained? The case of ASEAN
can be captured by a perspective founded on sociological institutionalism in the
field of sociology, the main focus of which is the issue of institutional isomorphism.
The focus of this perspective is on what can be regarded as the ‘mimetic adoption’
of external norms on the part of local actors, with the intention of enhancing their
legitimacy.
From this perspective, I argue in this article that the pursuit of new cooperative
security agendas on the part of the ASEAN members should be seen as a set of
instances of their mimetic adoption of external norms for the sake of legitimacy.
They have mimetically been adopting a set of norms associated with the collective
management of conflicts, which have been practiced by the participant states of the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – or the Conference
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) until 1994. They have been doing
so, with the intention of securing their identities as legitimate members of the
community of modern states, and of enhancing the status of ASEAN and the ARF
as legitimate cooperative security institutions.
In this article, the contributions which I seek to make to the existing literature
in the field of International Relations (IR) are on two dimensions. First, I
contribute to the comparative study of regional security institutions. As suggested
by Michael Barnett and Emanuel Adler, institutional isomorphism and emulation
are important themes in this area.5 However, few empirical studies have addressed
them. Second, I contribute to the literature on norm diﬀusion. I bring forward
evidence for the claim that the mimetic adoption of external norms for the sake of
legitimacy is one of the pathways by which norms travel from one region to
2 With regard to the third stage, the ARF Concept Paper produced by ASEAN used the expression
‘development of conflict-resolution mechanisms’. However, at China’s request, the Chairman’s
Statement of the 1995 ARF used instead the words: ‘the elaboration of approaches to conflicts’.
ASEAN, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper’, 18 March 1995; and ARF, ‘Chairman’s
Statement, the Second ASEAN Regional Forum’, Brunei Darussalam (1 August 1995).
3 See ARF, ‘Chairman’s Statement, the Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum’, Subang Jaya (27 July
1997).
4 ASEAN, ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II’, Bali (7 October 2003); and ASEAN, ‘ASEAN
Security Community Plan of Action’, Vientiane (29 November 2004).
5 Michael Barnett and Emanuel Adler, ‘Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and
History’, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 419.
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another. The existing literature has paid insuﬃcient attention to this pathway for
two reasons, if not more. The first reason is a range of methodological diﬃculties
involved in the empirical demonstration of the employment of a mimetic policy by
actors, intended to enhance their legitimacy. Evidence for the operation of a
mimetic mechanism is hard to show. The second reason is the lack of attention to
developing countries. If the mimetic adoption of external norms is indeed relevant,
it must be these countries which commonly employ such a policy. This is because
they usually seek the status of legitimate members of the community of modern
states, which advanced-industrial countries take for granted. Nonetheless, as
Amitav Acharya points out, the existing literature on norm diﬀusion tends to
downplay the agency role of local actors.6 Its main focus is on the activities of
developed countries and international organisations led by such countries, as well
as transnational activities spreading from the developed world to other places.7 I
address these two points in this article. That is to say, I empirically demonstrate
the employment of a mimetic policy on the part of developing countries, thereby
underlining the relevance of mimetic adoption in terms of norm diﬀusion.
In what follows, I first make it clear in what sense the case of ASEAN is
remarkable. I then set out a perspective focusing on the mimetic adoption of
norms. Next, I demonstrate empirically that the ASEAN members’ pursuit of new
cooperative security agendas should be seen as a set of instances of their mimetic
adoption of external norms. In the concluding section, I discuss some policy
implications, which are especially relevant to European policymakers.
1. Pursuit of new norms
What is so interesting about the case of ASEAN? What is so remarkable about the
pursuit of new cooperative security agendas on the part of the ASEAN members?
There are three points which make this case interesting: first, the ASEAN members
have been adopting new norms; second, they have been adopting norms which
compete with the existing ones; and third, they have been adopting such norms
voluntarily and in the absence of great power politics or transnational struggles.
First, the ASEAN members have been adopting new norms – that is, standards
for behaviour – namely, a set of norms associated with the collective management
of conflicts.8 These ideational elements are based on the notion that internal and
6 Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional
Change in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization, 58:2 (2004), p. 242.
7 See, for example, Martha Finnemore, ‘International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The UN
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy’, International Organization,
47:4 (1993), pp. 565–97; Alexandra Gheciu, ‘Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO
and the “New Europe”’, International Organization, 59:4 (2005), pp. 973–1012; Thomas Risse,
Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and
Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Margaret E. Keck and
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998).
8 Norms are broadly defined as shared – thus social – understandings of standards for behaviour.
Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1995), p. 14; and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 22.
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international conflicts should be managed collectively within the framework of a
regional cooperative security institution. They have been adopting these new norms
while departing from a set of diplomatic norms associated with the ASEAN Way
of diplomacy. The ASEAN Way norms emphasise the association’s autonomy and
its members’ sovereignty, on the basis of the principles of non-interference in the
internal aﬀairs of other members and decision-making through consensus.9
The claim that the ASEAN members have been adopting new norms is based
on the observation that they have been redefining the goals of ASEAN diplomacy
by consensus. Both realists and constructivists would probably agree with the claim
that, traditionally, the primary goals of ASEAN diplomacy in the past were
autonomy and sovereignty – the maintenance of ASEAN’s autonomy vis-à-vis
external powers and of each other’s sovereignty in Southeast Asia.10 The ASEAN
members sought to keep a certain distance from external powers in the area of
security, and also avoided implementing intrusive measures to address internal and
international conflicts, although these conflicts have always been rampant in
Southeast Asia. In contrast, ASEAN’s new cooperative security agendas prioritise
security cooperation with external powers over its autonomy, and the collective
management of conflicts over its members’ sovereignty. It should be noted that the
ASEAN members take various attitudes to the implementation of the new
cooperative security agendas. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that
the so-called ASEAN-6 countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the
Philippines and Brunei – have been active while the so-called CLMV countries –
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – have been rather cautious about any
abrupt implementation. Nevertheless, all the members have agreed on what their
association ought to be doing. Documents such as the 2003 ASEAN Concord II
are the product of consensual decision-making.
Second, the ASEAN members have been adopting norms which compete with
the existing ones. In other words, there is little compatibility between a set of ideas
associated with the collective management of conflicts and the ASEAN Way
norms, in that the former involves flexible interpretations of the core principles of
the latter – that is, autonomy and sovereignty. Thus, ASEAN’s new cooperative
security agendas are inconsistent with the traditional goals of autonomy and
sovereignty. To begin with, the ARF agendas – that is, CBMs, PD and conflict
resolution – may lead to the involvement of external powers, such as the US,
Japan, Australia and China, in Southeast Asian aﬀairs. The setting of these
agendas in the ARF may backfire on the ASEAN members, in that it will at least
invite discussions of measures which are deemed intrusive. If measures to prevent
9 Hiro Katsumata, ASEAN’s Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN
Regional Forum (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), pp. 51–3; Hiro Katsumata, ‘Reconstruc-
tion of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the ASEAN Way’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25:1 (2003), pp. 104–21; David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-
Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 14–27; and
Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of
Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), chap. 2.
10 See, Michael Leifer, ‘ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community?’, in Hadi Soesastro (ed.),
ASEAN in a Challenged Regional and International Political Economy (Jakarta: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1995), p. 130; Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia
(London: Routledge, 1989); Amitav Acharya, ‘Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?’, International
Security, 28:3 (2003), pp. 149–64; and Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast
Asia.
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and resolve conflicts were provided for in the ARF, conflict-ridden Southeast Asia
would probably be the first place in which such measures were utilised. It is worth
noting that the ARF is an ASEAN-led forum, in which the association’s members
should be able to avoid these agendas.
With regard to the plan for an ASEAN security community, measures to
manage conflicts collectively – that is, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and
post-conflict peace building – may involve international measures which could be
deemed intrusive. Take, for example, the case of the OSCE: the measures for the
prevention and resolution of conflicts pursued by the OSCE participant states
include ‘missions’, or ‘field activities’, ‘mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of
disputes’ and ‘peace-keeping activities’.11 These measures are incompatible with the
traditional practice of the ASEAN members. Under their strict interpretation of
sovereignty, the dispatch of missions or troops to carry out operations in the field
would constitute an act of interference.
One might argue that the aim of the security community plan is to enhance
ASEAN’s autonomy by developing its own measures to manage conflicts, so as to
avoid the involvement of external powers in Southeast Asian aﬀairs.12 However,
this line of argument is implausible, because an ASEAN security community and
the ARF are two sides of a single coin, although the participants of the latter
include external powers. In their plan for a security community, the ASEAN
members have expressed their preference for ‘[s]trengthening the ARF process’ and
‘moving the ARF to the preventive diplomacy stage and beyond’.13
The ASEAN members’ adoption of norms which lack compatibility with their
former one is notable, in the context of the constructivist literature. For
constructivists, norms which are external or new to a given situation may prove
influential so long as they are compatible with existing ideational elements in a
local society.14 Yet new norms do not always require compatibility to be
influential. This relates to the next point.
Finally, the ASEAN members have voluntarily been adopting norms which
compete with the existing ones, and have been doing so in the absence of great
power politics and transnational struggles. The existing literature suggests that
norms without compatibility can be promoted in a local society, when they are
backed by great powers or transnational struggles, although the greater the level
of incompatibility, the tougher great power politics or transnational struggles must
be.15 In the case of ASEAN, the level of compatibility was by no means high;
11 See, CSCE, ‘Helsinki Document 1992: the Challenges of Change, Helsinki Decisions’, Helsinki (9–10
July 1992); and OSCE, OSCE Handbook (2000), third edition (Vienna: OSCE, 2000), pp. 42–85.
12 I thank an anonymous reviewer on this point.
13 ASEAN, ‘Activities, annexed to ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’, Vientiane (29
November 2004).
14 Jeﬀrey T. Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’,
International Studies Quarterly, 43:1 (1999), pp. 83–114; Steven Bernstein, ‘Ideas, Social Structure
and the Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism’, European Journal of International Relations, 6:4
(2000), pp. 464–512; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), p. 908; Martha Finnemore, The Purpose
of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003),
pp. 67, 71; and Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, pp. 204–5.
15 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights’, in Volker Rittberger and Peter
Mayer (eds), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
pp. 139–67; Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983);
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however, both great power politics and transnational struggles were largely absent.
To my knowledge, the ASEAN members were neither put under pressure nor
oﬀered incentives by great powers, such as the US or the European Union (EU),
when they were drafting the ARF Concept Paper and the plan for an ASEAN
security community. It is worth noting, for example, that the position of the
Clinton administration toward the ARF process was passive, when ASEAN was
drafting the concept paper in 1994/1995. The US was to support any ideas explored
by Asian countries, as long as their ideas did not challenge its bilateral alliances
and forward military presence.16 In addition, tough transnational struggles were
also absent. Activities at the unoﬃcial level have been an integral part of
Asia-Pacific cooperative security, but the nature of such activities is collaborative
rather than confrontational.17
Notwithstanding these three points, critics may question the significance of the
case of ASEAN, by arguing that what is actually taking place in Southeast Asia
is a set of rhetorical changes rather than normative ones. We should certainly not
overestimate the magnitude of the change. The ASEAN members’ implementation
of the new cooperative security agendas has been slow. In the ARF, the measures
which have currently been implemented are not mature enough to be called
‘CBMs’ and ‘PD’ in the strict sense. The CBMs in the ARF are based on
consultation and consensus – for example, a security dialogue on common
concerns and enhanced contacts including high-level visits. They do not involve
Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism’,
International Organization, 50:2 (1996), pp. 339–40; Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention,
pp. 18–9, 146–7; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights; Keck and Sikkink,
Activists Beyond Borders; Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change’, pp. 896–9; Audie Klotz, ‘Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-
Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences’, European Journal of International Relations, 8:1 (2002),
pp. 49–76.
16 In March 1993, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord stated, with regard to multilateral
approaches to security, ‘We are open-minded on the arenas. We will heed the ideas of others, like
[. . .] ASEAN’. Winston Lord, ‘A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Foreign Policy’,
Opening Statement at [Senate Foreign Relations Committee] Confirmation Hearings (31 March
1993). Also see Department of Defense of US, ‘US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific
Region’ (27 February 1995); and Katsumata, Asean’s Cooperative Security Enterprise, chap. 7.
17 Unoﬃcial settings are called ‘track two’, while inter-governmental channels are called ‘track one’.
The track-two activities are intended to support intergovernmental endeavours. The key players in
the track-two activities have been participants of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and
International Studies (ISIS). ASEAN-ISIS is a coalition of strategic studies institutions of the
Southeast Asian countries, and is registered with the ASEAN Secretariat as a non-governmental
organisation (NGO). It is a network of researchers in these institutions who provide policy
recommendations to their own governments. ASEAN-ISIS should be distinguished from other types
of transnational activities, such as ‘transnational social movements’ or ‘transnational advocacy
networks’. Such transnational activities often challenge governments. In contrast, the ASEAN-ISIS
institutions have never attacked their own governments. Their role is to support the governments by
exploring various innovative ideas and oﬀering prudent policy advice. What makes ASEAN-ISIS
diﬀerent from other NGOs is each member institution’s strong link with its government. Their links
are maintained by meetings to discuss policies, the presentation of reports, and most importantly,
informal personal relationships. Through such channels, input is sent to the governments from the
institutions. ASEAN-ISIS plays a central role in the series of annual conferences of the Asia-Pacific
Roundtable, which will be discussed later. For ASEAN-ISIS, see Katsumata, Asean’s Cooperative
Security Enterprise, chap. 4; and Hiro Katsumata, ‘The Role of ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and
International Studies in Developing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Asian Journal
of Political Science, 11:1 (2003), pp. 93–111. For transnational social movements, see, Klotz,
‘Transnational Activism and Global Transformations’. For transnational advocacy networks, see,
Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.
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specific rules and mechanisms for the exchange of military information. The PD
measures considered in the ARF are limited to modest ones, such as the
development of a code of conduct, the enhancement of channels of communication,
and the enhanced role of the ARF chairman.18
This slow progress is due to several factors, which make the situation in Asia
more complicated than those in other parts of the world. To begin with, the ARF
is a forum in which nearly thirty countries participate, with diverse strategic
interests. In this forum, even if the ASEAN members decide to implement new
agendas, they will still have to negotiate with other participant countries. In
addition, even in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN countries are facing at least two
challenges in developing a security community. One is a mere practical issue: most
of these countries lack enough experience and operational capabilities to manage
regional conflicts. The minor powers in Southeast Asia are constrained by the lack
of resources, and thus need more time. The other is a tough geopolitical
environment, the elements of which include a rising China. In such an environ-
ment, for the minor powers of Southeast Asia, the strengthening of unity in their
association has been crucial. Thus, the ASEAN-6 countries cannot aﬀord to
alienate the CLMV countries by trying to implement the new agendas abruptly.
After all, the material environment in Southeast Asia is more favorable to the
ASEAN Way norms, which by their emphasis on state sovereignty may promote
the unity of the association.
Against the background of these challenges, in the foreseeable future, the
ASEAN members’ implementation of the new cooperative security agendas will not
be simple and straightforward. They will probably have to do at least two things in
pursuing an ASEAN security community. The first is to adopt a two-tier approach,
in which the six active members start implementing new measures among themselves,
and the CLMV countries join them later. This kind of approach has already proven
useful in the area of economic cooperation. The second is to implement field
activities with the consent of the government concerned. This is indeed the standard
practice of many other regional organisations, including the OSCE/CSCE, which
has been active in areas such as the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus region.19
In the first half of the 1990s, the international community learned that cooperation
with the concerned government is essential for eﬀective field operations.20
Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the significance of the case of
ASEAN. A normative change has certainly been taking place, and the steady
establishment of an ASEAN security community has been in progress. Thus, the
practice of the ASEAN members in the field has been changing, reflecting their
18 ARF, ‘ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy’, Bangkok (27
July 2000), adopted at the 8th ARF, Ha Noi (25 July 2001).
19 OSCE, OSCE Handbook (2000), p. 45; and OSCE, OSCE Handbook (2008) (Vienna: Press and
Public Information Section, OSCE, 2008), pp. 39–79. It should be noted that the OSCE/CSCE
participant states have the means to punish the government in question – that is, the consensus-
minus-one rule, which allows them to make decisions without the consent of the state concerned.
They invoked this rule in 1992 to suspend Yugoslavia from the group. ASEAN’s measures will
probably not involve such an exceptional rule, but instead a modified interpretation of the
non-interference principle – the notion that, as long as the interested government is consulted, the
dispatch of missions or troops to carry out operations in the field would not constitute an act of
interference.
20 UN, ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN’, A/50/60-S/1995/1 (3 January 1995).
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acceptance of a flexible interpretation of state sovereignty. In concrete terms, it has
increasingly been ‘normal’ for them to send troops or task forces to the territories
of other members. Most notably, in August 2005, several ASEAN members –
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei – sent their troops to
the Indonesian province of Aceh to monitor the peace agreement between the
government and the rebel force. It is true that the ASEAN participants had to
collaborate with the EU on the Aceh mission, due to their lack of experience and
capabilities. Still, the ASEAN members have made clear their intention to develop
measures to manage conflicts further, by stating that the Aceh mission is a model
for cooperation in their security community.21 For the completion of a security
community, what remains now for them to do is to gain experience and to develop
capabilities. In addition, the field activity of Malaysia in the Philippine island of
Mindanao deserves attention. In October 2004, Malaysia organised an inter-
national monitoring team, composed mainly of its military personnel, to monitor
the ceasefire agreement between the Manila government and the anti-government
force in Mindanao. The cooperation between Kuala Lumpur and Manila here was
remarkable because their relations had been thorny for decades, due to the
territorial dispute over the Sabah region.22 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the
cyclone disaster in May 2008, the Southeast Asian countries established an
ASEAN humanitarian task force which coordinates international aid operations in
Myanmar.23 This can be regarded as another important step toward an ASEAN
security community, since humanitarian assistance is an integral element of such a
community.24
Bearing in mind these observations, I explore the way in which the ASEAN
members have been adopting the conflict-management norms. My focus is on their
common concern, or the factor which unites them in adopting these new norms by
empowering the active members and encouraging the cautious ones to appreciate
these norms. In the next section, I set out a perspective founded on sociological
institutionalism.
2. Mimetic adoption of norms
The focus of the perspective set out here is on what can be regarded as the
‘mimetic adoption’ of external norms on the part of local actors, with the intention
of enhancing their legitimacy. Mimetic adoption for the sake of legitimacy takes
place in a social environment. In a community in which a particular norm is widely
shared, the champion of the norm enjoys legitimacy. In such a social environment,
21 ASEAN, ‘Chairman’s Statement of the Eleventh ASEAN Summit’, Kuala Lumpur (12 December
2005).
22 See, Oﬃce of the Press Secretary, Republic of the Philippines, ‘Arrival of Malaysian Peace Monitors
a Major Break for Mindanao Peace Agenda – Afable’ (8 October 2004); and Ayesah Abubakar,
‘Keeping Peace: the International Monitoring Team (IMT) Mission in Mindanao’, The SEACSN
Bulletin, Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network, Malaysia (January–June 2005).
23 ASEAN, ‘Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting Chairman’s Statement’, Singapore (19 May
2008).
24 ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’; and ASEAN, ‘Activities’, annexed to
ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action.
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actors who seek an identity or status as a legitimate member of the community
mimetically adopt the champion’s norm. From this perspective, when their goals
became unclear or their identity became unstable, countries involved in regional
institutions look to other institutions which enjoy legitimacy, and adopt the norms
practiced there.
This perspective is founded on the sociological literature on institutional
isomorphism. This literature suggests that the mimicking of external models for the
sake of legitimacy explains the isomorphic structures of various organisations, such
as firms, schools, hospitals and nation states. For example, almost all states have
national flags, airlines, and similar educational systems. They all seek similar
high-tech weapons, and have tripartite military structures, with an army, air force
and navy.25 According to Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, when goals are
ambiguous or uncertain, organisations model themselves upon other organisations
which they perceive to be more legitimate or successful, so as to enhance their own
legitimacy.26
The sociological literature either implicitly or explicitly takes into consideration
the impact of the social environment. Legitimacy is important for actors in terms
of an identity or status as a member of the community to which they seek to
belong, and the source of legitimacy is to be found in the social environment. In
other words, the norms shared by the members of a community are what define an
identity as a legitimate community member.27 The literature suggests that the
international social environment – or the world culture – may define various things
as elements of legitimacy as members of the community of modern states, including
airlines, national education systems and tripartite military structures. It defines the
practice of pioneer states in the given issue area as a legitimate model to be
emulated by others.
Mimetic behaviour for the sake of legitimacy should be distinguished from
policy emulation, intended to resolve particular problems. The latter type of
behaviour is commonly discussed by IR scholars. Examples include the ‘policy
emulation’ on the part of European countries of German’s neo-liberal monetary
policy in the 1970s,28 and ‘policy bandwagoning’ pursued by various countries in
25 John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, ‘World Society and
Nation-State’, American Journal of Sociology, 103:1 (1997), pp. 144–81; John W. Meyer, Francisco
O. Ramirez, and Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, ‘World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870–1980’,
Sociology of Education, 65:2 (1992), pp. 128–49; Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, and
Suzanne Shanahan, ‘The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of
Women’s Suﬀrage Rights, 1890 to 1990’, American Sociological Review, 62:5 (1997), pp. 735–45;
John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and
Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, 83:2 (1977), pp. 340–63; Mark C. Suchman and Dana
P. Eyre, ‘Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons
Proliferation’, Sociological Forum, 7:1 (1992), pp. 137–61; Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman,
‘Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach’,
in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 79–113; and Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture, and
World Politics’, pp. 334–7.
26 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review, 48:2 (1983),
pp. 151–2, 4–5.
27 David L. Deephouse, ‘Does Isomorphism Legitimate?’, Academy of Management Journal, 39:4
(1996), pp. 1024–39.
28 Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the EU (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
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the 1980s, in the form of copying the privatisation policy implemented by Margaret
Thatcher.29 This kind of view is certainly relevant; however, it is also necessary to
be aware of the possibilities of emulation for a more fundamental concern: actors
with unstable identity must seek legitimacy.
The sociological literature on institutional isomorphism is worth exploring, in
the context of the IR literature on norm diﬀusion. IR constructivists believe that
actors who adopted new norms through emulation for legitimacy or status
concerns may eventually internalise their ideational appropriateness.30 Neverthe-
less, there have been few empirical studies demonstrating the actors’ employment
of a mimetic policy. To put forward the claim that mimetic behaviour for the sake
of legitimacy is one of the pathways by which norms spread, we need to investigate
the actors’ intentional behaviour. The sociological literature on institutional
isomorphism tends to emphasise structure at the expense of agency, so as to
identify isomorphism across units.31 The same thing can be said of the literature
on policy diﬀusion, which often takes into consideration the relevance of mimetic
behaviour.32 What is required is the actors’ side of the story, focusing on their
agency. Any claim of the relevance of this pathway would be weak, unless it
demonstrated the actors’ intentional employment of a mimetic policy. In this
respect, it is worth noting that some IR authors have focused on the mimetic
policies of particular countries or organisations. However, in their arguments, the
evidence for the operation of a mimetic mechanism is correlational. It concerns the
unique structure of the unit, which is puzzling from the viewpoint of functional
calculations but consistent with an external model.33 Stronger evidence for the
operation of this mechanism needs to be shown. Therefore, in the next section, I
29 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The International Spread of Privatization Policies: Inducements, Learning, and
“Policy Bandwagoning”’, in Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury (eds), The Political Economy of
Public Sector Reform and Privatization (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 88–110. For other
examples, see, Nina P. Halpern, ‘Creating Socialist Economies: Stalinist Political Economy and the
Impact of Ideas’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy:
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 87–110;
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 128; and
Ann Florini ‘The Evolution of International Norms’, International Studies Quarterly, 40:3 (1996),
pp. 363–89.
30 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’; Finnemore, The
Purpose of Intervention, p. 158; and Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Conclusions and Extensions: Toward
Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe’, International Organization, 59:4 (2005), pp. 1021–2.
31 Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics’.
32 See Katharina Holzinger, Christoph Knill, and Thomas Sommerer, ‘Environmental Policy Conver-
gence: The Impact of International Harmonization, Transnational Communication, and Regulatory
Competition’, International Organization, 62: 4 (2008), pp. 553–87; Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin,
and Geoﬀrey Garrett, ‘Introduction: The International Diﬀusion of Liberalism’, International
Organization, 60:4 (2006), pp. 781–810; Chang Kil Lee and David Strang, ‘The International
Diﬀusion of Public-Sector Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Driven Learning’, Inter-
national Organization, 60:4 (2006), pp. 883–909; and Pre-Olof Busch and Helge Jörgens, ‘The
International Sources of Policy Convergence: Explaining the Spread of Environmental Policy
Innovations’, Journal of European Public Policy, 12:5 (2005), pp. 860–84.
33 See Emily O. Goldman, ‘The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji
Japan’, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriﬀ (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics,
Technology (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 41–67; Theo Farrell, ‘World Culture and the
Irish Army, 1922–1942’, in ibid., pp. 69–90; and Terry Terriﬀ, ‘US Ideas and Military Change in
NATO, 1989–1994’, in ibid., pp. 91–116. For important exceptions, see, AlastairIain Johnston, Social
Status: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008),
chap. 2; and J. C. Sharman, ‘Power and Discourse in Policy Diﬀusion: Anti-Money Laundering in
Developing States’, International Studies Quarterly, 52:3 (2008), pp. 635–56.
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seek to demonstrate the actors’ employment of a mimetic policy, on the basis of
evidence derived from the process of policy formation and implementation. By so
doing, I bring forward evidence for the claim that mimetic behaviour is one of the
pathways by which norms spread.
3. ASEAN’s cooperative security agendas
The pursuit of new cooperative security agendas on the part of the ASEAN
members should be seen as a set of instances of their mimetic adoption of external
norms for the sake of legitimacy. They have mimetically been adopting a set of
norms practiced by the OSCE/CSCE participant states – a set of norms associated
with the collective management of conflicts which is based on the notion that
internal and international conflicts should be managed collectively within the
framework of a regional cooperative security institution. They have been doing so,
with the intention of securing their identities as legitimate members of the
community of modern states, and of enhancing the status of ASEAN and the ARF
as legitimate cooperative security institutions. They have been employing mimetic
policies, in a social environment which defines the above norms as elements of
international legitimacy and the champion of these norms, the OSCE/CSCE, as a
legitimate cooperative security institution.
With regard to the three agendas of the ARF – CBMs, PD and conflict
resolution – the intention of the ASEAN members has been to enhance the status
of the newly-established forum as a legitimate cooperative security institution, as
well as their own status as legitimate players who are eligible to lead Asia-Pacific
cooperative security. Having established a region-wide forum in the early 1990s,
they began to consider what agendas to pursue in it. Here they looked to the
OSCE/CSCE, which they perceive as a legitimate pioneer institution in the area of
cooperative security, and pursued norms practiced by the OSCE/CSCE participant
states.
With regard to the plan for an ASEAN security community, the intention of
the ASEAN members has been to salvage the credibility of their association. In
other words, their intention has been to reverse the trend of losing credibility,
which began in the late 1990s, with various challenges in the background, including
the Asian financial crisis, terrorism, and non-traditional issues such as pandemic
diseases. It was Indonesia which initially proposed the security community plan. In
2003/2004, following alphabetical order, Jakarta, one of the key players of
ASEAN, took over as chairperson. In the Bali Summit of October 2003, it put
forward the security community plan, and with the consent of other members,
Indonesia’s plan became ASEAN’s oﬃcial agenda. With the intention of salvaging
the credibility of ASEAN, its members, led by Indonesia, looked to the
OSCE/CSCE. They pursued new norms, associated with ‘conflict prevention’,
‘conflict resolution’ and ‘post-conflict peace building’, thereby trying to make their
cooperative security institution resemble the European one.
My aim in this section is to demonstrate empirically the plausibility of the set
of claims above, centred on the proposition that the ASEAN members have
mimetically been adopting the OSCE/CSCE norms for the sake of legitimacy. It is
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relatively easy to present correlational evidence to support these claims. I have
already suggested in the first section that the new agendas of the ASEAN countries
are inconsistent with their traditional goals of autonomy and sovereignty. Yet it
can be said that what they have been doing is consistent with an external model.
In other words, their new cooperative security agendas correspond with those
implemented by the participant states of the OSCE/CSCE.
The OSCE/CSCE can be regarded as the pioneer institution in the area of
regional security cooperation – a successful model to be emulated by other regional
institutions. Cooperative security agendas such as conflict prevention and post-
conflict peace building have become universal concepts, which have been consid-
ered within the framework of the United Nations. At the regional level, it is the
OSCE/CSCE which has been pioneering various cooperative security activities. In
the post-Cold War era, the OSCE/CSCE participant states are strengthening their
CBM regime, which was originally established during the East-West confrontation,
by introducing additional rules.34 They have also begun to take on new
responsibilities, including the prevention and resolution of conflicts.35 With these
developments in the background, it is said that the OSCE/CSCE has developed
into a ‘security community-building institution’.36
This being so, in what way can we approach the intentional employment of
mimetic policies on the part of the ASEAN members – or more specifically,
ASEAN policymakers and domestic actors in Indonesia, bearing in mind that the
security community plan was initially proposed by Jakarta? My starting point is
interview data. The intention of key individuals involved in the development of an
ASEAN security community to enhance the association’s legitimacy has been
exhibited in various ways. ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong repeatedly
told the author, in the context of security cooperation, that ASEAN has been
trying to ‘project its responsibility’ beyond Southeast Asia.37 An Indonesian
diplomat, who played a central role in the series of meetings of ASEAN senior
oﬃcials in 2003, recalls that the key factor motivating them to agree on the plan
for a security community was their interest in the ‘wide-ranging recognition of the
importance of ASEAN’ by non-ASEAN countries.38 With this in mind, in the rest
of this section, to substantiate my claims, I demonstrate three things: (1) that the
ASEAN members have been concerned with their international status; (2) that they
have always looked to the OSCE/CSCE and, (3) that they have consistently
attempted to display their adoption of the OSCE/CSCE model.
3.1 Pursuing status
The ASEAN members have been trying to be regarded as advanced and legitimate.
That is to say, they have been trying to secure their status as legitimate members
34 OSCE, OSCE Handbook (2008), pp. 80–2.
35 See CSCE, ‘Helsinki Document 1992’.
36 Emanuel Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE’s Security Community-Building Model’, in
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), pp. 119–60.
37 Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore (27 November 2007).
38 Interview with an anonymous Indonesian diplomat, Jakarta (9 January 2008).
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of the community of modern states, which advanced-industrial countries take
for granted. Two points, which underline their pursuit of status, are worth
mentioning. First, they are greatly concerned with categories such as First World
or Third World countries. Most notably, the Philippines has recently declared its
vision of attaining ‘first-world status’ in two decades. For President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, her country is ‘on the way to winning the grand prize of
First World status’.39 Many other ASEAN members also seem to be pursuing a
similar aim. For more than a decade, Malaysia has sought its Vision 2020 – its
plan to become a ‘fully-developed country’ by 2020.40 Thus, its latest national
development plan aims to put the nation on ‘track to achieve developed nation
status by 2020’.41 For the Thai Deputy Prime Minister, Somkid Jatusripitak, his
country should ‘step forward as part of the First World’.42 Even Singapore takes
the issue of status seriously. Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has maintained that
Singapore should move from the ‘lower half’ to the ‘upper half’ of the First
World.43
Second, they are highly concerned with ASEAN’s reputation, which is a
function of the degree of compliance with the prevailing norms in the community
of advanced-industrial countries. This is most apparent in the area of human
rights. ASEAN’s human rights practice has been criticised by the advanced-
industrial democracies, and thus some of its members have been calling for changes
in the association’s traditional practice. When they do so, they commonly invoke
ASEAN’s international reputation. For example, when the Myanmar government
crushed pro-democracy demonstrations in Yangon, the foreign ministers of the
ASEAN members expressed their concern that the ‘developments in Myanmar had
a serious impact on the reputation and credibility of ASEAN’.44 In addition,
Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong is concerned about the ‘perception that
ASEAN has failed to deal with [the issue of Myanmar]’.45 Moreover, the
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, states, ‘the situation in Myanmar
aﬀects our credibility’. On the basis of his observation that human rights are still
a sensitive topic in Southeast Asia, he raises the question: ‘what kind of message
are we sending to the rest of the world?’46
39 Presidential Management Staﬀ, ‘The 2007 State of the Nation Address: Technical Report’, Manila
(July 2007), p. 46; and Oﬃce of the President, ‘PGMA: RP on Way to First World Status in 20
Years’, Manila (19 January 2007).
40 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Malaysia: The Way Forward (Vision 2020)’ (28 February 1991), published by
the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia.
41 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘Speech at the Tabling of the Motion on the Ninth Malaysia Plan,
2006–2010’, Dewan Rakyat (31 March 2006).
42 Bangkok Post, ‘Somkid: Thailand on the Verge of ‘First World’ Status’ (27 December 2003).
43 ChannelNewsAsia, ‘Better Quality of Life Will Define Singapore as a Top First World Nation’ (25
February 2007).
44 ASEAN, ‘Statement by ASEAN Chair Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs George Yeo’, New
York (27 September 2007).
45 Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore (27 November 2007).
46 Interview with Hassan Wirajuda, Jakarta (9 January 2008). For the Southeast Asian policymakers’
concern about ASEAN’s international reputation, also see, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘Forging a
United, Resilient and Integrated ASEAN’, address at the Opening of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting, Kuala Lumpur (25 July 2006); and ASEAN, ‘Chairperson’s Statement of the Twelfth
ASEAN Summit’, Cebu, Philippines (13 January 2007).
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3.2 Looking to the OSCE/CSCE
Throughout the process of the development of cooperative security, the ASEAN
members have always looked to the OSCE/CSCE. This indicates that they have
perceived this European institution as a legitimate model, or a champion of global
normative elements, and that this institution has been the source of the norms
which they have adopted. The OSCE/CSCE may not be the only regional
institution in which conflicts are addressed collectively by its participants, but the
Southeast Asian countries have concentrated on the European model.
These claims run counter to the common assumption that the ASEAN
members reject the European model. It is true that they usually underline the
diﬀerences between Europe and Southeast Asia when referring to the practices of
their European counterparts.47 However, it should be mentioned that their
discourse has never been critical of the OSCE/CSCE. The fact that they commonly
make reference to the OSCE/CSCE suggests that they regard it as a successful
institution.
The model institution to which the ASEAN members have looked should be
identified independently of their behaviour in terms of norm adoption, so as to
avoid a circular reasoning. In other words, the claim that they have looked to the
OCSE/CSCE should be supported independently of the observation that they have
since the mid-1990s adopted the norms practiced in this European institution. In
this respect, in this subsection, I focus on two things to demonstrate the ASEAN
members’ concern with the European model: their appreciation of common
security thinking during the establishment process of the ARF, from the late
1980s to the early 1990s; and their Deutschian security community discourse in the
2000s.
Ideational basis of establishment of ARF. During the process of the establish-
ment of the ARF, the Southeast Asians had been inspired by ‘common security’
thinking, developed in the CSCE process. Such thinking is based on the view that
regional security is indivisible and can be achieved only through cooperative
undertakings.48 Inspired by such an idea, in the late 1980s, some policymakers and
researchers in strategic studies institutions who make policy recommendations to
governments began to explore the possibilities of cooperative security agendas to
be pursued in the Asia-Pacific region. At the time, much of the discussion was
carried out in unoﬃcial settings, in particular, in the series of annual conferences
of the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, held in Kuala Lumpur.49 In the 1990s, the
discourse of security cooperation flourished at the oﬃcial level. One of the main
47 See, Ali Alatas, ‘Statement at the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting’, Kuala Lumpur
(19–20 July 1991); Datuk Abdullah Bin Ahmad Badawi, ‘Welcome Remarks at the Meeting between
ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners’, Kuala Lumpur (22 July 1991); and Singapore, ‘Notice Paper
No. 236 of 2007: Questions for Oral Answers for Parliament Sitting’ (17 September 2007).
48 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Security: A Programme for
Disarmament (London: Pan Books, 1982); and OSCE, OSCE Handbook (2000), p. 2.
49 See, Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), In Search of Peace: Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the
Pacific, Proceedings of the First Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 10–11 January 1987 (Kuala
Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1988); Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Building Confidence, Resolving Conflicts,
Proceedings of the Second Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 1–4 July 1988 (Kuala Lumpur:
ISIS Malaysia, 1989); and Rohana Mahmood (ed.), Peace in the Making, Proceedings of the Third
Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June 16–19, 1989 (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1990).
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points at issue was the extent to which the CSCE model was applicable to the
Asia-Pacific region. Australia in 1990 called for an Asian version of the CSCE,
marking the beginning of intense discussion.50 Singapore had also considered
security cooperation modelled on the experience of the CSCE.51
The ASEAN countries’ initiation of the ARF process was their attempt to
practice external cooperative norms founded on common security thinking, in the
context of local/regional norms, namely, a set of diplomatic norms associated with
the ASEAN Way of diplomacy.52 Although these countries had never oﬃcially
endorsed the idea of creating an Asian version of the CSCE, they were supporting
the spirit of security cooperation which constituted the basis of such an idea.
Thus, in the early 1990s, they initiated a cooperative security dialogue, aimed
at promoting a sense of mutual trust. They preferred an informal approach,
characterised by a low degree of institutionalisation, as opposed to rigidly
institutionalised mechanisms or a CSCE type of institution. This was due to their
commitment to their traditional diplomatic norms, which had been reflected in
their discourse of cooperation in the early 1990s.53
ASEAN security community discourse. In Southeast Asia in the 2000s, the
discourse of Deutschian security communities has been salient. The Southeast
Asians have set out the plan for an ASEAN security community, inspired by Karl
Deutsch’s security community literature.54 This is why Deutsch’s core concept,
‘we-feeling’, is frequently mentioned in their discourse. Indonesian President
Megawati Soekarnoputri stated, in the 2004 ASEAN ministerial meeting, ‘We must
create a “we-feeling” [. . . W]e can manage to resolve our disputes peacefully and
amicably.’55 Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono emphasised in 2005
that the word ‘community’ entails the cultivation of a we-feeling.56 Malaysian
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi underlined in 2004 the importance of a
common set of community values and a we-feeling.57 Furthermore, ASEAN’s Plan
of Action for a security community states that components of such a community
include the strengthening of ASEAN’s solidarity in terms of a we-feeling.58 This
kind of Deutschian discourse indicates that the ASEAN members have been
concerned with the European experience in general, including the activities of the
50 Gareth Evans, ‘Opening Statement at the Meeting between ASEAN and Dialogue Partners’, Jakarta
(27–29 July 1990).
51 Michael Vatikiotis, ‘Time for Decisions’, Far Eastern Economic Review (16 January 1992), pp. 23–4.
52 Katsumata, Asean’s Cooperative Security Enterprise, chap. 4; Hiro Katsumata, ‘Establishment of the
ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a “Talking Shop” or a “Norm Brewery”?’, Pacific Review,
19:2 (2006), pp. 181–98; and Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread’.
53 See, ASEAN, ‘Joint Communiqué, The Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting’, Kuala
Lumpur (19–20 July 1991); ASEAN, ‘Singapore Declaration’ (28 January 1992); Alatas, ‘Statement
at the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting’; and Badawi, ‘Welcome Remarks at the Meeting
between ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners’.
54 Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization
in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
55 Megawati Soekarnoputri, ‘Statement at the Opening Session of the Thirty Seventh ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting’, Jakarta (30 June 2004).
56 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘On Building the ASEAN Community: The Democratic Aspect’,
Lecture at the 38th Anniversary of ASEAN, Jakarta (8 August 2005).
57 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘Towards an ASEAN Community’, address at the ASEAN National
Colloquium on ASEAN, Shah Alam, Malaysia (7 August 2004).
58 ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’.
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OSCE/CSCE. The focus of Deutsch’s literature is on the North Atlantic area,
encompassing Europe. It is said today that the OSCE has developed into what can
be regarded as a ‘security community-building institution’.59
The origin of the Deutschian security community discourse in Southeast Asia
is the domestic process in Indonesia. The idea of an ASEAN security community
was first proposed to the Indonesian foreign ministry by the Jakarta-based Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In this institute, such an idea was
initially developed by a few mid-career researchers who hold PhDs from such
European universities as London and Birmingham. They developed their policy
recommendation on the basis of the Deutschian literature, with which they were
familiar. For example, they thought that, although Deutsch’s concern was confined
to military security issues, the focus of an ASEAN security community should be
expanded to cover non-military issues also. Many of their counterparts in the
foreign ministry, holding post-graduate degrees from European or North American
universities, were also conversant with IR concepts. Most notably, when he met
the CSIS researchers, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, who holds a master’s
degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, asked them in what
sense an ASEAN security community would be diﬀerent from Deutschian
communities.60
3.3 Displaying the adopted OSCE/CSCE model
With the aim of supporting the main claim – that the ASEAN members have
mimetically been adopting norms for the sake of legitimacy – the third point to
demonstrate is the fact that they have consistently attempted to display their
adoption of the OSCE/CSCE model, even though this adoption prioritises the
appearance of their cooperative security institution over its functions. Their
intention to display the adoption of a legitimate model can be understood in terms
of their pursuit of international legitimacy.
To capture the ASEAN members’ attempts to display their adoption of the
OSCE/CSCE model, it is necessary to note the ‘decoupling’ between their actual
practices and the external model. For sociological institutionalists, decoupling is a
common feature of organisations which are copying an external model for the sake
of legitimacy.61 As noted above, the ASEAN members’ implementation of the new
cooperative security agendas has been slow. They have only been able to
implement modest measures, which are based on consultation and consensus, in
comparison with the case of the OSCE/CSCE. While pursuing this kind of
decoupling, they have attempted to display their adoption of the OSCE/CSCE
model. Although the ARF measures which have currently been implemented are
59 Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change’.
60 The discussion of the domestic process in Indonesia is based on the author’s interviews with Rizal
Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Singapore (7 October 2005), and with Edy
Prasetyono, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Singapore (8 January 2007).
61 Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, ‘World Society and Nation-State’, pp. 154–6; Meyer and
Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations’; and W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer, and Associates,
Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (Thousand
Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1994).
572 Hiro Katsumata
not mature enough to be called ‘CBMs’ and ‘PD’ in the strict sense, they have used
these designations. In addition, beyond their current practices, they also emphasise
new agendas as their future goals.
Along with these behaviours pertaining to decoupling, the ASEAN members’
intention to display their adoption of the OSCE/CSCE model can be derived from
the process since the early 1990s of developing cooperative security. In the rest of
this subsection, I explore three remarkable points in this process, which demon-
strate their intention: first, that the announcements of new agendas have preceded
changes in the existing diplomatic norms; second, that the announcements of new
agendas have been prompt; and third, that the new agendas have been announced
without a common understanding about whether and in what ways they might be
implemented.
Announcements preceding norm change. The ASEAN members have been
announcing their adoption of new cooperative security agendas, before making a
departure from the ASEAN-Way norms. They have been doing so, although the
new agendas are incompatible with the ASEAN Way of diplomacy. While the
former calls for the collective management of conflicts in ASEAN and in the ARF,
which is a forum involving external powers, the latter emphasises autonomy and
sovereignty. In the early 1990s, when the ASEAN members began considering
the agendas to be pursued in the newly-established ARF, few in Southeast Asia
had questioned the relevance of the ASEAN Way. Only in the late 1990s and the
early 2000s did they begin to reconsider its relevance. The normative change has
been slow. Thus, when they announced the plan for an ASEAN security
community in 2003, they also underlined the importance of the principles of
non-interference.62 This kind of process can only be understood when considering
their intention to display the adoption of a legitimate model. Without such an
intention, unless a third party had put pressure on them or oﬀered them incentives,
the announcements and the normative change could only have developed in
tandem.
Prompt announcements of new agendas. The ASEAN members have been setting
out and announcing their new cooperative security agendas promptly, without
engaging in lengthy debate. They have been doing so in the absence of pressures
or incentives from third parties. What explains this kind of process is their
intention to display the adoption of the OSCE/CSCE model.63 In the ARF, it took
less than a year for them to set out the three agendas – CBMs, PD and conflict
resolution – although the pursuit of these agendas in the forum involving external
powers was inconsistent with their traditional goals of autonomy and sovereignty.
At the first ARF meeting in July 1994, the form of Asia-Pacific cooperative
security was unclear.64 Thus, after this ministerial meeting, the ASEAN members
began to consider agendas to be pursued in the new forum. They held several
meetings at the senior oﬃcial level, explored various issues on the basis of a draft
62 ASEAN, ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II’.
63 Kurt Weyland argues that, if the quest for legitimacy drives policy choice, the appearance of a
novelty should immediately trigger emulation and policy diﬀusion should get under way in an
explosive fashion. Kurt Weyland, ‘Theories of Policy Diﬀusion: Lessons from Latin American
Pension Reform’, World Politics, 57:2 (2005), p. 276.
64 See ARF, ‘Chairman’s Statement, the First ASEAN Regional Forum’, Bangkok (25 July 1994).
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document prepared by Singapore, and agreed in March 1995 on the ARF Concept
Paper.65 The three agendas in this concept paper were oﬃcially adopted in the
second ARF meeting in August.66
With regard to the plan for an ASEAN security community, at the govern-
mental level, it took only a few months for the ASEAN members to reach an
agreement. It was at an informal meeting of senior oﬃcials in July 2003 that
Indonesia for the first time put on the agenda the idea of an ASEAN security
community. Since then, the senior oﬃcials held several rounds of meetings. It is
true that some of them were initially sceptical of the idea put forward by Jakarta.
Nonetheless, they reached an agreement before the Bali Summit of October 2003,
in which Indonesia’s plan was oﬃcially endorsed by all the ASEAN leaders.67 In
addition, even when the domestic policymaking process in Jakarta is included, the
whole process took only about a year. It was approximately a year before the Bali
Summit that domestic actors in Indonesia began preparing for this meeting. The
foreign ministry became attentive to the advice oﬀered by the researchers of the
CSIS, and its oﬃcials began to hold regular meetings with the researchers. Foreign
Minister Hassan Wirajuda also met the researchers at least three times. Wirajuda
and his ministry oﬃcials raised few objections to the ideas proposed by the
researchers.68 Through this domestic process, the plan for a security community
became Indonesia’s oﬃcial policy.
Announcements without common understanding. The ASEAN members have
been announcing their new cooperative security agendas, before reaching a
common understanding about whether and in what ways they might be imple-
mented. They began debating over implementation measures only after announcing
the new agendas. This is understandable, from the standpoint of their intention to
display the adoption of a legitimate model. Had they not held such an intention,
they could only have announced the new agendas after reaching a broad consensus
on their implementation.
With regard to the three ARF agendas, it can hardly be said that the ASEAN
members had held a common understanding about their implementation when they
produced the ARF Concept Paper in 1995. They had at best shared the view that
CBMs might first be pursued on the basis of dialogue and consensus.69 A few years
after the launching of the ARF process, in 1997, they decided to start exploring the
possibilities of PD.70 Since then, they have been discussing this issue through
oﬃcial and unoﬃcial channels. At present they have been able to agree only on
modest PD measures in terms of intrusiveness. Measures stated in their document
on PD in 2000 include the development of a code of conduct, the enhancement of
channels of communication, and the enhanced role of the ARF chairman.71
65 Interview with an anonymous Asian diplomat, Singapore (5 March 2004).
66 ARF, ‘Chairman’s Statement, the Second ASEAN Regional Forum’.
67 The discussion of the senior oﬃcials meetings is based on the author’s interviews with an anonymous
Indonesian diplomat, Jakarta (9 January 2008).
68 Interview with Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Singapore (7 October
2005); and interview with Edy Prasetyono, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Singapore
(8 January 2007).
69 See ARF, ‘Chairman’s Statement, the Second ASEAN Regional Forum’.
70 See ARF, ‘Chairman’s Statement, the Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum’.
71 ARF, ‘ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy’.
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With regard to the security community plan, a similar process to the above can
be identified, in which the ASEAN members announce new agendas without a
common understanding about their implementation, and then start discussing
concrete measures. Thus, when they announced this plan in October 2003, in the
ASEAN Concord II, they simply listed relevant notions such as ‘conflict
prevention’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘post-conflict peace building’. A CSIS
researcher who took part in the Indonesian domestic process admitted that Jakarta
had not been able to make it clear what these notions meant.72 In the following
year, Jakarta kick-started the discussion of possible implementation measures by
proposing the creation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force.73 This proposal was not
supported by many others. The ASEAN members adopted a Plan of Action for a
security community in November 2004. The measures for conflict prevention,
stipulated in this plan, largely overlap with the PD measures in the ARF. Some of
the conflict resolution measures are notable, such as the utilisation of peacekeeping
centres in member states. In the context of post-conflict peace building, the roles
of ASEAN are considered in post-conflict reconstruction, involving human
resource development and institutional building, as well as in humanitarian
assistance, such as the provision of safe havens in conflict areas and the
repatriation of displaced persons.74 The ASEAN members are now exploring the
specific ways in which these roles might be played, on the basis of a document
which should be regarded as a blueprint for an ASEAN security community. For
example, they are now trying to develop common operating procedures for the
provision of humanitarian assistance.75
Conclusion
To the extent that the ASEAN members have mimetically been adopting a set of
norms practiced by the OSCE/CSCE participant states, cooperative security in
Southeast Asia is increasingly becoming ‘Western’ in nature. With the intention of
enhancing their international legitimacy, they have mimetically been adopting the
conflict-management norms practiced by the OSCE/CSCE participant states. This
finding gives support to the claim that mimetic adoption for the sake of legitimacy
is one of the pathways by which norms travel from one region to another.
One relevant issue to be considered here is the relationship between this
pathway and other ones, such as great power politics and transnational activities.
Their relations can be conceptualised in two ways: either complementarity or in
substitution. First, mimetic adoption may complement other pathways by facili-
tating the eﬀorts to promote norms on the part of great powers, international
organisations or transnational actors. It should be mentioned here that this kind
of complementarity can only be achieved when the promoters of new norms do not
72 Abdul Khalik, ‘RI Must Explain ASC to ASEAN Members’, The Jakarta Post (11 December 2003).
73 Antara, ‘RI Takes Initiative to Form ASEAN Peacekeeping Force by 2012’, Jakarta (20 February
2004).
74 ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’; and ASEAN, ‘Activities’, annexed to
ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action.
75 ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint’, Cha-am, Thailand (1 March 2009),
p. 13.
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provoke their counterparts’ antipathy. Second, mimetic adoption may substitute
for other pathways, by realising norm transfer when they are ineﬀective. IR
constructivists have identified some conditions for norm transfer. As noted already,
they have focused on the compatibility between new and existing norms. They have
also suggested that norms without compatibility can be promoted when they are
backed by great powers or tough transnational struggles. Yet the findings of this
article demonstrate that norms may spread even in the absence of compatibility,
great power politics and transnational struggles. Local actors may voluntarily
adopt external norms for the sake of legitimacy, even if the new norms compete
with existing ones.
Some policy implications are in order. The claim that mimetic adoption is one
of the pathways for norm diﬀusion leads to policy advice. Bearing in mind the
relevance of this pathway, promoters of norms may work toward the creation of
a social environment which facilitates mimetic adoption. They may seek an
environment which defines their norms as elements of international legitimacy and
their policies and institutions as a legitimate model to be emulated by others.
This kind of advice may be useful, especially for European policymakers, in the
area of cooperative security. The spread of the conflict-management norms from
Europe to other parts of the world must serve the interests of the European
countries. This is because the collective management of conflicts may lead to the
promotion of humanitarianism, which constitutes an integral element of their
interests. To facilitate the spread of their conflict-management norms, the
European policymakers may work toward the strengthening of the social environ-
ment which defines the OSCE as a legitimate cooperative security institution. To
do so, they may expand the activities of the OSCE, thereby enhancing the
credibility of their institution at the global level. An exemplary activity in this
regard is the monitoring by an OSCE delegate of the US presidential election in
November 2004.76
So far so good: however, what is questionable is the long-term sustainability of
the European policymakers’ eﬀort to facilitate the spread of their conflict-
management norms. This is because ‘the West’ is in general losing its moral appeal
today in the global society, largely due to its handling of the issues of Islam.77 The
decline in the overall moral appeal of the European countries inevitably aﬀects the
legitimacy of their status in the area of cooperative security. In other words, it will
damage the social environment which facilitates the mimetic adoption of their
norms by other countries. The European countries are facing a serious challenge
today. Unless they manage to salvage their overall moral appeal, their eﬀort to
enhance the credibility of the OSCE will be fruitless.
76 Dow Jones International News, ‘US Invites International Nov Election Observers’ (10 August 2004);
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